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Abstract
In statistical decision theory involving a single decision-maker, one says
that an information structure is better than another one if for any cost
function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which
is restricted to be only a function of some measurement, the solution
value under the former is not worse than the value under the latter. For
finite probability spaces, Blackwell’s celebrated theorem on comparison
of information structures leads to a complete characterization on when
one information structure is better than another. For stochastic games
with incomplete information, due to the presence of competition among
decision makers, in general such an ordering is not possible since addi-
tional information can lead to equilibria perturbations with positive or
negative values to a player. However, for zero-sum games in a finite prob-
ability space, Pęski introduced a complete characterization of ordering of
information structures. In this paper, we obtain an infinite dimensional
(standard Borel) generalization of Pęski’s result. A corollary of our analy-
sis is that more information cannot hurt a decision maker taking part in a
zero-sum game in standard Borel spaces. During our analysis, we establish
two novel supporting results: (i) a partial converse to Blackwell’s order-
ing of information structures in the standard Borel space setup and (ii) a
refined existence result for equilibria in zero-sum games with incomplete
information when compared with the prior literature.
1 Introduction
Characterizing the value of information structures is a problem in many disci-
plines involving decision making under uncertainty. In stochastic control theory,
it is well-known that more information cannot hurt a given decision maker since
the decision maker can always choose to ignore this information. In statistical
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decision theory involving a single decision maker, one says that an information
structure is better than another one if for any given measurable and bounded
cost function involving a hidden state variable and an action variable which is re-
stricted to be only a function of some measurement, the solution value obtained
under optimal policies under the former is not worse than the value obtained
under the latter. For finite probability spaces, Blackwell’s celebrated theorem
[6] on the ordering of information structures obtains a precise characterization of
when an information structure is better. This finding has inspired much further
research as reviewed in e.g. [10, 30].
Since Blackwell’s seminal 1953 paper [6], significant work has been done
to extend Blackwell’s results to team problems and games. Stochastic team
problems (known also as identical interest games) were studied in a finite-space
setting by Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya [13]; see also [40, Chapter 4]. How-
ever, for games, in general, such an ordering is not possible since additional
information leads to a perturbation which is not necessarily monotone due to
the presence of competitive equilibrium, where unlike in a team setup, informa-
tion can have both positive and negative value to a player in a general game.
Some of the earlier accounts on such phenomena are [18] and [2], where the lat-
ter studied the comparison of information structures for team-like (LQG) and
zero-sum like (quadratic duopoly) games.
As noted above, for general non-zero sum game problems, informational
aspects are very challenging to address and more information can hurt some
or even all of the players in a system, see e.g. [18, 17, 20, 1]. To make this
discussion more concrete, we provide the following example due to Bassan et al.
[5].
Example 1.1 Consider a card drawn at random from a deck, where its colour
can be either red or black, each with probability 1/2. Player 1 first declares
his guess of the colour, and then, after hearing what Player 1 guessed, Player
2 submits her guess for the colour. If both players guess the same colour, the
payout is $2 each, whereas if one player guesses correctly, that player receives a
payout of $6 and the other player receives $0.
In the case where both players are uninformed about the colour of the card,
the expected payout is $3 each, as Player 1’s optimal strategy is arbitrary, and
Player 2’s optimal strategy is to guess the opposite colour of what Player 1’s
guessed.
In the case where both players are informed of the colour of the card prior
to declaring their guess, the equilibrium for the game occurs when both players
guess the true colour of the card. In this case, the expected payout becomes $2
for each player. ⋄
Bassan et al. [5] further provided sufficient conditions for games to have the
‘positive value of information property’, where providing additional information
to some or all players results in greater or equal payoffs for all players [5].
Gossner and Mertens highlighted zero-sum games as a particularly interesting
class to study in the context of ordering information structures in games and did
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preliminary work on this ordering [16]; zero-sum games provide a worthwhile
class of games to study due to the fact that, under mild conditions, every game
has a value (achieved at a saddle point).
For comparison of information structures in zero-sum games with finite mea-
surement and action spaces, Pe¸ski provided necessary and sufficient conditions,
and thus a complete characterization [29]. Prior to Pe¸ski’s results, De Meyer,
Lehrer, and Rosenberg had shown that the value of information is positive in
zero-sum games, albeit with a slightly different setup than Pe¸ski, where their
payoff depended on an individual ‘type’ for each player rather than a common
state of nature; their results were applicable for infinite action spaces and finite
type spaces [25]. Furthermore, Lehrer and Shmaya studied a ‘malevolent na-
ture’ zero-sum game played between nature and a player in a finite setting, and
characterized a partial ordering of information structures for these games [24].
In this paper, we generalize Pęski’s results to a broad class of zero-sum games
with standard Borel measurement and action spaces: we recall that a metric
space which is complete and separable is called a Polish space, and a Borel
subset of a Polish space is called a standard Borel space. Finite dimensional
real vector spaces are important examples of such spaces.
Toward this goal, additional supporting results, which may be of independent
interest, are obtained: sufficient conditions are presented (i) for the existence of
saddle-point equilibria in zero-sum games with incomplete information and (ii)
for a partial converse to Blackwell’s ordering when the player has standard Borel
measurement and action spaces and the unknown variable also takes values from
a standard Borel space.
2 A review of prior results and contributions
2.1 Comparison of information structures in single-agent
problems
Let x ∼ P be an X-valued random variable with X being a standard Borel
space. We call x the state of nature; P is known by the decision maker but
x is not. Recall that a standard Borel space is a Borel subset of a complete,
separable, metric (Polish) space. Let Y, our measurement space, be another
standard Borel space and y be Y-valued, defined with
y = g(x, v)
for some independent noise variable v (which, without any loss, can be taken
to be [0, 1]-valued). In the above, we can view g as inducing a measurement
channel Q, which is a stochastic kernel or a regular conditional probability
measure from X to Y in the sense that Q( · |x) is a probability measure on the
(Borel) σ-algebra B(Y) on Y for every x ∈ X, and Q(A| · ) : X→ [0, 1] is a Borel
measurable function for every A ∈ B(Y).
Given a fixed X, Y, and P , a single player decision problem is a pair (c,U)
of a cost function c(x, u) : X× Y→ R and an action space U.
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Using stochastic realization results (see Lemma 1.2 in [15], or Lemma 3.1 of
[9]), it follows that the functional representation in y = g(x, v) is equivalent to a
stochastic kernel description of an information structure, since for every Q, one
can define g and a [0, 1]-valued random function V so that the representation
holds almost surely.
Let P(X) denote the set of all probability measures on (the Borel sigma field
over) X. For P ∈ P(X) and kernel Q, we let PQ denote the joint distribution
induced on (X× Y,B(X× Y)) by channel Q with input distribution P :
PQ(A) =
∫
A
Q(dy|x)P (dx), A ∈ B(X× Y).
Now, let the objective be one of minimization of the cost
J(P,Q, γ) = EQ,γP
[
c(x, u)
]
, (1)
over the set of all admissible measurable policies Γ := {γ : Y → U} with
u = γ(y), where c : X × U → R is a Borel measurable cost function and EQ,γP
denotes the expectation with initial state probability measure given by P , under
policy γ, and given channel Q.
The comparison question is the following: when can one compare two mea-
surement channels Q1, Q2 such that
inf
γ∈Γ
J(P,Q1, γ) ≤ inf
γ∈Γ
J(P,Q2, γ),
for a large class of single-player decision problems in (1)?
We now recall the notion of garbling. We note that garbling is sometimes
defined to be equivalent to physical degradedness of communication channels
(as opposed to stochastic degradedness) [11], however in this paper we will take
stochastic degradedness and garbling to be equivalent.
Definition 2.1 An information structure induced by some channel Q2 is gar-
bled (or stochastically degraded) with respect to another one, Q1, if there exists
a channel Q′ on Y× Y such that
Q2(B|x) =
∫
Y
Q′(B|y)Q1(dy|x), B ∈ B(Y), P a.s. x ∈ X.
We also define the following notion:
Definition 2.2 An information structure µ is more informative than another
information structure Φ if
inf
γ∈Γ
EΦ,γP [c(x, u)] ≥ inf
γ∈Γ
Eµ,γP [c(x, u)]
for all single player decision problems (c(x, u),U).
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In view of Proposition 2.1, we have the following.
We emphasize that in Definition 2.2, U is also a design variable for the
decision problem. For instance, if U were a singleton, then the comparison
of information structures would be meaningless. With this in mind, we state
Blackwell’s classical result in the following.
Theorem 2.1 [Blackwell [6]] Let X,Y be finite spaces. The following are equiv-
alent:
(i) Q2 is weakly stochastically degraded with respect to Q1 (that is, a garbling
of Q1).
(ii) The information structure induced by channel Q1 is more informative than
the one induced by channel Q2 for all single player decision problems with
finite U.
That (i) implies (ii) follows from the next result, which is an immediate
finding in statistical decision theory, and Jensen’s inequality.
Proposition 2.1 The function
V (P ) := inf
u∈U
∫
c(x, u)P (dx),
is concave in P , under the assumption that c is measurable and bounded.
For a proof of this proposition see [40, Theorem 4.3.1].
The converse, ii) implies i), is significantly more challenging. For the case
with general spaces, related results are attributed to [7], and [28], [35], which
relate an ordering of information structures in terms of dilations and their rela-
tion with comparisons under concave functions defined on conditional probabil-
ity measures. A very concise yet informative review is in [10, p. 130-131] and a
more comprehensive review is in [36]. We will present a direct proof that will be
utilized in our main result of the paper and present a comparative discussion.
2.2 Comparison of information structures in zero-sum game
problems
Now, consider a zero-sum game generalization of the problem above, with two
decision makers.
Consider a two-agent setup as follows.
yi = gi(x, vi), i = 1, 2,
where the noise variables v1 and v2 are independent. Suppose that gi induces a
channel Qi for i = 1, 2 as described earlier and DM i has only access to yi. Let
γ = {γ1, γ2} denote the measurable policies of the agents.
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Given fixed X, Y1, Y2, and ζ such that x ∼ ζ, a gameG = (c(x, u1, u2),U1,U2)
is a triple of a measurable and bounded cost function c(x, u1, u2) : X×U1×U2 →
R and action spaces for each player U1,U2.
We will impose one of the following conditions on the information structures.
We note that Assumption 2.2 implies Assumption 2.1, but this assumption often
allows for a simpler interpretation. That this implication holds is a consequence
of the independent measurements reduction formulation to be explained in detail
later in the paper (see Theorem 3.1. The results will be presented under the
more general Assumption 2.1).
Assumption 2.1 The information structure is absolutely continuous with re-
spect to a product measure:
P (dy1, dy2, dx)≪ Q¯1(dy1)Q¯2(dy2)P (dx),
for reference probability measures Q¯i, i = 1, 2. That is, there exists an integrable
f which satisfies for every Borel A,B,C
P (y1 ∈ B, y2 ∈ C, x ∈ A) =
∫
A,B,C
f(x, y1, y2)P (dx)Q¯1(dy1)Q¯2(dy2)
Assumption 2.2 The following conditional independence (or Markov) condi-
tion holds:
P (dy1, dy2, dx) = Q1(dy1|x)Q2(dy2|x)P (dx)
where the measurements of agents are absolutely continuous so that for i = 1, 2,
there exists a non-negative function f i and a reference probability measure Q¯i
such that for all Borel S:
Qi(yi ∈ S|x) =
∫
S
f i(yi, x)Q¯i(dyi)
Let the joint measure P (dy1, dy2, x) define the information structure for the
game and let us denote this with µ. For a zero-sum game with the conditional
independence assumption in Assumption 2.1, an information structure µ consists
of private information structures µ1 and µ2 defined with Qi, i = 1, 2. Define µi
as the joint probability measure induced on P(X×Yi) by measurement channel
Qi with input distribution P (dx). For our analysis we will also allow policies to
be randomized with independent randomness. Under conditional independence,
let us define the following cost functional for a single-stage setup:
J(P, µ1, γ1, µ2, γ2) = E
Q1,Q2,γ
P
[
c(x, u1, u2)
]
=
∫
X×Y
c(x, γ1(y1), γ2(y2))Q1(dy1|x)Q2(dy2|x)P (dx)
Suppose that DM 1 (the minimizer) wishes to minimize the cost and DM
2 (the maximizer) wishes to maximize the cost. Let γ1 and γ2 be defined as
earlier for each decision maker.
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Definition 2.3 Given an information structure µ, we say that γ1,∗, γ2,∗ is an
equilibrium for the zero-sum game if
inf
γ1∈Γ1
J(P, µ1, γ1, µ2, γ2,∗) = J(P, µ1, γ1,∗, µ2, γ2,∗)
= sup
γ2∈Γ2
J(P, µ1, γ1,∗, µ2, γ2).
Let V µG (γ
1, γ2) be the expected value of the cost function c for the maximizer,
for some game G, given information structure µ and strategies (γ1, γ2) for the
minimizer and maximizer, respectively:
V µG (γ
1, γ2) =
∫
c(x, γ1(y1), γ2(y2))Q1(dy1|x)Q2(dy2|x)P (dx)
Let V ∗(G,µ) be V µG (γ
1, γ2) where (γ1, γ2) are chosen to be the equilibrium
strategies for the players.
Definition 2.4 For fixed X,Y1,Y2 and ζ such that x ∼ ζ, we say that an
information structure µ is better for the maximizer than information structure
Φ (written as Φ . µ) over all games in a class of games G if and only if for all
games G in G:
V ∗(G,µ) ≥ V ∗(G,Φ)
Definition 2.5 We denote by κiµ the information structure in which player i’s
information from µ is garbled by a stochastic kernel κi. Explicitly, this means
the information structure becomes:
(κiµ)(B, dy−i, dx) =
∫
Yi
κi(B|yi)µ(dyi, dy−i, dx), B ∈ B(Yi)
We use Ki to denote the space of all such stochastic kernels κi for player i.
Theorem 2.2 (Pęski [29]) Let X,Y1,Y2 be finite. For any two information
structures µ and ψ, µ is better for the maximizer than ψ over all games with fi-
nite action spaces U1,U2 if and only if there exist kernels κi ∈ Ki, i = min,max,
such that
κminψ = κmaxµ,
In particular, under Assumption 2.2, we have the more explicit characterization
with
κminQ1Φ = Q
1
µ and Q
2
Φ = κ
maxQ2µ.
Where Qiµ and Q
i
Φ are the measurement channels for player i under information
structures µ and Φ, respectively.
In this paper we will obtain a standard Borel generalization of this result.
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2.3 Team Theoretic Setup
For completeness, we also discuss the team theoretic setup in our review. It fol-
lows from [22] and [40, Chapter 4] that Blackwell’s ordering, with a measurement-
independent randomization (though which can be common across the decision
makers), leads to an ordering of information structures for static stochastic team
problems.
2.4 Contributions
In this paper, we will derive a standard Borel counterpart of Theorem 2.2.
While obtaining our results, we will also derive conditions for the existence of
saddle points in Bayesian zero-sum games in standard Borel spaces, as well as a
converse theorem to Blackwell’s ordering of information structures in the infinite
setup.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) We will derive a standard Borel counterpart of Theorem 2.2 characterizing
an ordering of information structures for zero-sum games (Theorem 4.1).
(ii) We present two supporting results: (a) As a minor technical contribu-
tion, we present sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle points in
Bayesian zero-sum games with incomplete information in standard Borel
spaces (Theorem 3.1). This will build on placing an appropriate topology
on the space of policies adopted by the decision makers. Our analysis
generalizes existing results in the literature, notably [26] and [23], though
as we note in the paper our generalization is rather technical and the con-
ditions in [26] are nearly equivalent to ours. (b) As a further supporting
theorem, we will present a partial converse to Blackwell’s ordering theo-
rem for standard Borel spaces, using a separating hyperplane argument
and properties of locally convex spaces (Theorem 3.2). This presents an
explicit, self-sufficient derivation for a converse theorem to be utilized in
our main theorem, though related comprehensive results have been re-
ported in the literature, as we note in the paper.
3 Supporting Results on Existence of Saddle-Points
and Comparison for Zero-Sum Games with Stan-
dard Borel Spaces
3.1 On Existence of Saddle-Points and Equilibria
Prior to focusing in on the ordering of information structures, we present a sup-
porting result regarding when equilibrium solutions to zero-sum games exist. In
the finite case, equilibrium solutions always exist [37] (through e.g. [3, Theorem
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4.4]), but this does not hold true in general [27]. Theorem 3.1 below gives suf-
ficient conditions for equilibrium solutions to exist for games with incomplete
information.
The existence of a value for games with incomplete information has been
studied rather extensively. For readers’ convenience, and as a direct proof, we
present the result below; to our knowledge our statement and conditions have
not been stated in the prior literature, though results nearly equivalent to ours
have been noted rather indirectly: Most notably, [26, Theorem 1] presents an
existence result for more general games, and presents conditions whose general-
ity is difficult to interpret: a careful look at condition R1 in [26, p. 625] leads to
the conclusion that the authors have nearly (but not exactly) the same condition
(ii) we note below; that is continuity of the cost function in the actions for every
fixed hidden state variable x is sufficient, though the statements given in [26]
imposes conditions that are not conclusive on this; we attribute this to the fact
that the authors utilize [26, Prop. 1(c)] without establishing its relation to item
(ii) below (due to the measurability requirement in the statement of [26, Prop.
1(c)]). Our analysis affords the simplicity and generality in the condition, since
we build on the w-s topology, rather than weak topology and directly Lusin’s
theorem [12] as followed in [26] (we also note that the relation between weak and
w-s topologies on probabilities defined on product spaces with a fixed marginal
can in fact be established using Lusin’s theorem). Hence, in a strict sense, our
conditions are more direct and general as stated.
The comprehensive book [23, Proposition III.4.2.] imposes continuity in all
the variables (unlike what is presented below). Furthermore, [23, Proposition
III.4.2.] builds on a topology construction on policies which is different from
what we present here (we note that in control theory a related construction has
been utilized in [8]; see also [32]); the construction in [23] is rather abstract and
we would like to caution that in the absence of absolute continuity conditions on
the information structure, this construction may lead to a lack of closedness on
the sets of admissible policies (or strategic measures) as the counterexample [42,
Theorem 2.7] reveals: in this counterexample, which would reduce to the setup
studied here with y1 = y2 = y, a sequence of policies is constructed so that for
each element of the sequence the action variables of the two decision makers are
conditionally independent given their measurements, but the setwise (and hence,
weak) limit of the sequence is not conditionally, or otherwise, independent; and
thus the limit measure does not belong to the original information structure.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence of Equilibria) For a given game, assume that As-
sumption 2.1 holds. Further, let the following hold.
(i) The action spaces of players, U1,U2, are compact.
(ii) The cost function c is bounded and continuous in players’ actions, for
every state of nature x.
Then an equilibrium exists under possibly randomized policies, and so there ex-
ists a value of the zero-sum game.
Proof. Step (1): By Assumption 2.1, we can reformulate the problem in
a new probability space in which the measurements are independent from the
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unknown variable x. This reformulation, called an independent-measurements
reduction, is essentially due to Witsenhausen [38], with a detailed discussion in
[39, Section 2.2.], see Figure 1.
y2y1
Q1 Q2
⇐⇒
Q¯1 Q¯2y1 y2
c(x, u1, u2)
c¯(x, y1, y2, u1, u2) = c(x, u1, u2)f (x, y1, y2)
u1
u1
u2
u2
γ
1
γ
1
γ
2
γ
2
x
Figure 1: Reformulation of two information structures (with respect to an in-
dependent measurements reduction)
The main benefit of this approach is to define a compact/convex policy space
for the players (e.g. see [42, Section 2.2]). To complete this reformulation, we
note the following holds for some function f and reference probability measures
Q¯i:
P (dx, dy1, dy2, du1, du2) = ζ(dx)f(x, y1, y2)Q¯1(dy1)1{γ1(y1)∈du1}Q¯
2(dy2)1{γ2(y2)∈du2)}
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Thus, the value function for the game can
be written as:
V µG (γ
1, γ2) =
∫
f(x, y1, y2)c(x, u1, u2)Q¯1(dy1)Q¯2(dy2)ζ(dx)
We then create a new cost function c(x, u1, u2, y1, y2) = c(x, u1, u2)f(x, y1, y2).
Step (2): Let x ∈ X be the random state of nature. Let γ1, γ2 be the policies
for the players, and u1, u2 be the resulting actions chosen by the players. We
allow for policies γi where ui is chosen in a random way, i.e. ui = γi(yi, ωi),
where ωi is some [0, 1]-valued independent random variable (we note that any
randomized policy, defined as a stochastic kernel from Yi to Ui admits such a
stochastic realization; see [15, Lemma 1.2], or [9, Lemma 3.1]).
Step (3): Let c be the reformulated cost function of this game, under the
new product probability measure, we have:
V µG (γ
1, γ2) =
∫
c(x, u1, u2, y1, y2)(Q¯1γ1)(dy1, du1)(Q¯2γ2)(dy2, du2)ζ(dx)
Here, (Q¯1γ1)(dy1, du1) and (Q¯2γ2)(dy2, du2) are the probability measures in-
duced on the measurement and the action variables. By independence due to
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the reduction, we can consider the expected cost as a function of the reduced-
form policies: V µG (γ
1, γ2) = V µG (Q¯
1γ1, Q¯2γ2). Now, without loss of generality,
we fix Q¯1γ1, allowing us to express the above equation in the following form:
V µG (Q¯
1γ1, Q¯2γ2) =
∫
(Q¯2γ2)(dy2, du2)
∫
c(x, u1, u2, y1, y2)(Q¯1γ1)(dy1, du1)ζ(dx)
Let
∫
c(x, u1, u2, y1, y2)(Q¯1γ1)(dy1, du1)ζ(dx) be defined as c¯(u2, y2).
Now that we have an independent-measurements reduction, we will (similar
to the analysis from [26, 9, 42]), identify, almost surely, every admissible pol-
icy with a probability measure on the product space: we adopt the view that,
given game (G,µ), Q¯iγi is a probability measure on Yi×Ui with fixed marginal
Q¯i(dyi) on Yi. Let Γi denote the space of all such measures since every Q¯iγi can
be identified with an element in Γi almost surely. The pairing of an informa-
tion structure and a policy induces a probability measure P on the five-tuple:
(X,Y1,Y2,U1,U2), with
P (dx, dy1, dy2, du1, du2) = γ1(du1|y1)γ2(du2|y2)Q1(dy1|x)Q2(dy2|x)ζ(dx).
This construction allows us to obtain a proper topology to work with for
spaces of policies with desirable convexity and compactness properties.
We now recall the w-s topology [33] on the set of probability measures P(X×
U); this is the coarsest topology under which
∫
f(x, u)ν(dx, du) : P(X×U)→ R
is continuous for every measurable and bounded f which is continuous in u for
every x (but unlike weak topology, f does not need to be continuous in x).
Now, since the exogenous variables are fixed, weak convergence in this setting is
equivalent to w-s convergence (see [39]), and continuity in the exogenous variable
is not needed here. Consider a sequence of actions (Q¯2γ2)m(dy2, du2) which
converges to (Q¯2γ2)(dy2, du2) weakly. We have that c¯(u2, y2) is continuous in
u2. Since µ is fixed, the marginals on Y2 are fixed. Therefore, by [33, Theorem
3.10] (or [4, Theorem 2.5]), we can use the w-s topology on the set of probability
measures P(Y2 × U2). And so we have continuity of V µG (Q¯
1γ1, Q¯2γ2) in Q¯2γ2
in the w-s topology and, by the equivalence in this setting, the weak topology.
This also holds for continuity in Q¯1γ1 in the reverse case where we fix
Q¯2γ2. Therefore, in general, we have that V µG (·, ·) is continuous in (Q¯
iγi) when
(Q¯−iγ−i) is fixed.
Step (4): Let Γ = {λ ∈ P(Y× U) : λY = Q¯} be our reduced policy space,
where Q¯ is the fixed marginal of the measure λ on Y. Following from [42,
Section 2.1], the space of all Q¯iγi (which we denote by Γi) is compact under
weak convergence.
Step (5): We observe that V µG (Q¯
1γ1, Q¯2γ2) is linear and hence is both
concave and convex in each entry. For completeness, we establish this linearity
result. Take θ ∈ (0, 1). Then, without loss of generality, we fix Q¯1γ1 and obtain
the following:
V µG (Q¯
1γ1, θQ¯2γ2 + (1− θ)Q˜2γ˜2)
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=∫
(θQ¯2γ2 + (1− θ)Q˜2γ˜2)(dy2, du2)
∫
y2,u2
c¯(x, u2, y2)
=
∫
(θQ¯2γ2)(dy2, du2)
∫
y2,u2
c¯(x, u2, y2) +
∫
(1− θ)(Q˜2γ˜2)(dy2, du2)
∫
y2,u2
c¯(x, u2, y2)
=θV µG (Q¯
1γ1, Q¯2γ2) + (1 − θ)V µG (Q¯
1γ1, Q˜2γ˜2)
Lastly, we recall that, under the weak topology, the space of probability
measures is a metric space, and thus our spaces Γi are Hausdorff spaces.
Since V µG (Q¯
1γ1, Q¯2γ2) is continuous, and convex/concave in the compact
Hausdorff spaces Γi, we have the following equality [14, Theorem 1]:
min
Q1γ1
max
Q2γ2
V µG (Q
1γ1, Q2γ2) = max
Q2γ2
min
Q1γ1
V µG (Q
1γ1, Q2γ2)
This establishes a (saddle-point) equilibrium for the game. ⋄
Thus, we have obtained an existence result for the value of the games con-
sidered, and also provided an approach to topologize and convexify/compactify
the policy spaces.
3.2 On a Partial Converse to Blackwell Ordering in the
Standard Borel Setup
In addition to requiring conditions for the existence of equilibrium solutions in
the infinite case, we need to address the extension of Blackwell’s ordering of
information structures to the infinite case, as this will form a key aspect of the
proof of the main result of this paper, Theorem 4.1.
Here, we present a partial converse to Blackwell’s theorem.
The forward direction to Blackwell’s theorem holds in the infinite case (see
[40, Theorem 4.3.2]), i.e. when X, Y are standard Borel spaces for a single-
player setup, Φ being a weakly stochastically degraded version of µ implies
that µ is more informative than Φ over all single-player decision problems with
standard Borel action spaces and bounded cost functions that are continuous in
the player’s action for every state of nature.
As noted earlier, related results were presented by C. Boll in 1955 in an
unpublished thesis paper [7]. Le Cam presents a summary of these results in
[10], with a detailed review reported in [36]. The approach in the literature of-
ten builds on the construction of dilations of conditional probability measures,
which is related to Blackwell’s comparison of experiments theorem through what
is known as the Blackwell-Sherman-Stein theorem. A detailed comparative anal-
ysis is provided further below. Our main contribution here is an explicit converse
compatible with the conditions on existence results presented in the previous
section and a comparison to be presented in the next section. This result serves
as a supporting step with a direct proof; the results reported in the literature
are often very technical and the explicit implication for our setup is not evident
a priori as we discuss in the next subsection.
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Theorem 3.2 Let us consider a single player whose goal is to minimize the
value of the cost function c(x, u) for a set of single-player decision problems.
We assume the measurement is absolutely continuous in the following sense:
there exists a function f and a reference probability measure Q¯ such that for all
Borel S:
P (y ∈ S|x) =
∫
S
f(y, x)Q¯(dy)
If Y is compact and an information structure µ is more informative than another
information structure Φ over all single-player decision problems with compact
standard Borel action spaces and bounded cost functions c(x, u) that are contin-
uous in u for every x, then Φ must be a garbling of µ in the sense of Definition
2.1.
Proof. We note that under the conditions of the theorem, an optimal policy
(which is also deterministic) exists for every information structure (see Theorem
3.1 in [41]).
Step (1): Let ζ be the fixed probability distribution on X for any given deci-
sion problem in our set. Take information structures µ,Φ ∈ {P(X×Y) : PX = ζ},
where µ is more informative than Φ in Blackwell’s sense (i.e. J(ζ, µ, γ∗) ≥
J(ζ,Φ, γ∗) over all games with bounded cost functions c(x, u) that are continu-
ous in u).
Take the space Kµ, a subset of P(X × Y), to be the space of all possible
garblings of µ, where the garblings are from Y to Y.
Step (2): We now establish the weak compactness of the space of all garbled
information structures. First, observe that the set of all induced garblings on
the product space (involving all of K) inducing probability measures of the form
PK(dx, dy, dy˜) := µ(dx, dy)K(dy˜|y)
leads to a weakly pre-compact space in the space of probability measures on
X × Y × Y. If closedness can also be established, this would lead to a weakly
compact space. This follows from the proof of [39, Theorem 5.6]: since the
marginals on X × Y are fixed, any limit of a weakly converging limit will also
satisfy the property that the limit is a garbling of the original information
structure. For completeness, we present the following: Let PK(dx, dy, dy˜) :=
K(dy˜|y)µ(dx, dy) and consider a weakly converging sequence PKn(dx, dy, dy˜).
We will show that the weak limit also admits such a garbled structure. Let
PKn(dx, dy, dy˜) converge weakly to P (dx, dy, dy˜). Then, for every continuous
and bounded g
∫
g(x, y, y˜)PK(dx, dy, dy˜) =
∫ (∫
g(x, y, y˜)µ(dx|dy)
)
PKn(dy, dy˜)
Since the marginal on y is fixed, even though the function
∫
g(x, y, y˜)µ(dx|dy)
is only measurable and bounded in y and is continuous in y˜, w-s convergence is
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equivalent to the weak convergence of PKn(dy, dy˜) and as a result we have that∫ (∫
g(x, y, y˜)µ(dx|dy)
)
PKn(dy, dy˜)→
∫ (∫
g(x, y, y˜)µ(dx|dy)
)
P (dy, dy˜)
As a result, P decomposes as P (dx, dy, dy˜) = µ(dx, dy)K˜(dy˜|y) for some K˜.
This establishes the weak compactness of the garbled information structure in
the product space X× Y× Y.
Now, take the projection of this space onto the measures on the first and
the third coordinate; as a continuous image of a weakly compact set, this map
will also be compact and gives us our space Kµ.
Finally, KQ¯ is convex, since the space of stochastic kernels is convex. As
a result, the space Kµ of all possible garblings of µ is a convex and compact
subset of P(X× Y) under the weak convergence topology.
Now, assume there does not exist a stochastic kernel κ ∈ K such that:
Φ = κµ
Which is to say, we assume Φ is not a garbling of µ and proceed with a proof
by contradiction. Then, Kµ ∩ Φ = φ. That is, Φ /∈ Kµ.
Step (3): We now use the Hahn-Banach Separation Theorem for Locally Con-
vex Spaces by treating the space of probability measures P(X×Y) as a locally
convex space of measures (see [31, Theorem 3.4]). As such, since our spaces
Kµ and Φ are subsets of this space and are convex, closed and compact, in
addition to being disjoint, we can separate them using a continuous linear map
from P(X× Y) to R.
To apply [31, Theorem 3.4], we require local convexity of P(X×Y), and so we
define the locally convex space of probability measures with the following notion
of convergence: We say that νn → ν if
∫
f(x, y)νn(dx, dy) →
∫
f(x, y)ν(dx, dy)
for every measurable and bounded function which is continuous in y for every
x. We note that our measures must still have fixed marginal ζ on X.
Since continuous and bounded functions separate probability measures (in
the sense that, if the integrations of two measures with respect to continuous
functions are equal, the measures must be equal), it follows from [31, Theorem
3.10] that we can represent every continuous linear map on P(X×Y) using the
form:
F =
∫
f(x, y)Φ(dx, dy),
for some measurable and bounded function f(x, y) continuous in y for every x.
It also follows from [31, Theorem 3.10] that, given this notion of convergence,
P(X× Y) is a locally convex space.
Therefore, we have the following statement from combining [31, Theorem
3.4] and [31, Theorem 3.10]: there exists a measurable and bounded function
(continuous in y) f : X × Y → R and constants D1, D2 ∈ R where D1 < D2
such that:
〈Φ, f〉 ≤ D1, 〈κµ, f〉 ≥ D2, ∀ κ ∈ K
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Where we use the following notation:
〈Φ, f〉 =
∫
X×Y
f(x, y)Φ(dx, dy)
This gives us the following inequality: 〈Φ, f〉 < 〈κµ, f〉, ∀κ ∈ K.
Step (4): Now consider the class of decision problems with bounded cost
functions continuous in the actions, with compact Y, U, where U = Y. This
is clearly a subset of all decision problems considered so far in the proof. Now
let f(x, y) be the separating function found above. Consider a game in this
particular subclass where f(x, y) is the cost function (which is valid since U = Y
and f(x, y) is bounded continuous in y). We note that 〈Φ, f〉 gives the expected
value of the game with cost function f(x, y) under information structure Φ when
the player plays the identity policy γid(y) = y. We now observe the following:
∫
X×Y
f(x, y)Φ(dx, dy) <
∫
X×Y
f(x, y)κµ(dx, dy), ∀κ ∈ K
and hence,
≤ inf
κ∈K
∫
X×Y
f(x, y)κµ(dx, dy)
= inf
κ∈K
∫
X×Y
f(x, y′)
∫
Y
κ(dy′|y)µ(dx, y)
= inf
κ∈K
∫
X×Y
f(x, κ(y))µ(dx, dy)
But, since we allow for randomized policies, and K is the space of all stochastic
maps from Y to Y, this minimization over κ ∈ K is equivalent to finding the
optimal policy γ∗ ∈ Γ for the cost function f(x, y) under information structure
µ. And so we have:
∫
X×Y
f(x, y)Φ(dx, dy) = J(P,Φ, γid) < J(P, µ, γ∗) = inf
κ∈K
∫
X×Y
f(x, κ(y))µ(dx, dy)
Since we have found a game where, when playing its optimal policy, µ performs
worse than Φ does under some policy, we have contradicted the fact that µ is
better than Φ. Therefore, there must exist a κ ∈ K such that Φ = κµ, and so
Φ is a garbling of µ. ⋄
This result will allow us to use both directions of Blackwell’s ordering of
information structures in the standard Borel-type setup we are considering for
players in zero-sum games.
Dilations as Measures for Comparisons of Experiments and Strassen’s
Theorem. Strassen, in [35, Theorem 2], presents a related result that is often
attributed to when comparison of experiments is studied in infinite dimensional
probability spaces, although the direct implication on Blackwell’s ordering (in
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the sense needed in our main result to be presented in the next section) is
not explicit as we note in the following. Likewise, [28] relates an ordering of
information structures in terms of dilations (where the hidden variable x does
not appear explicitly in the analysis). A very concise yet informative review is
in [10, p. 130-131] and a more comprehensive review is in [36].
A detailed discussion on comparisons of information structures along the
same approach is present in the comprehensive book [36]. Both for completeness
as well as to compare the findings, we present a discussion in this subsection.
Let Ω be a convex compact metrizable subset of a locally convex topological
vector space. For Borel probability measures µ and ν write µ ≺ ν if and only if
for all y ∈ S = {all continuous concave functions on Ω}
∫
y dµ ≥
∫
y dν.
Theorem 3.3 [35, Theorem 2] µ ≺ ν if and only if there is a dilation P such
that ν = Pµ, where a dilation P is a Markov kernel from Ω to Ω such that for
all continuous affine functions z on Ω, zP = z.
It is not immediate whether this theorem leads to a converse to Blackwell’s
theorem in the general space setup that we have considered in the previous
section. Let us discuss the steps in the following: Let Ω be the space Y. Let µ
be an information structure that is more informative than another information
structure Φ in Blackwell’s sense. Let us restrict ourselves to decision problems
where U is compact. Let Qµ and QΦ be the measurement channels for the player
under information structures µ and Φ, respectively. By definition, we have for
all measurable and bounded cost functions c continuous in the actions:
inf
γ∈Γ
∫
P (dx)Qµ(dy|x)c(x, γ(y)) ≤ inf
η∈Γ
∫
P (dx)QΦ(dy|x)c(x, η(y))
We can rewrite this as:∫
Pµ(dy)( inf
u∈U
∫
Pµ(dx|y)c(x, u)) ≤
∫
PΦ(dy)( inf
u∈U
∫
PΦ(dx|y)c(x, u))
where Pµ and PΦ are probability distributions on Ω induced by the respective
information structures.
Let W ∗(y) = infu∈U
∫
P (dx|y)c(x, u). Then we can rewrite this once again
as: ∫
Pµ(dpi)W ∗(pi) ≥
∫
PΦ(dpi)W ∗(pi)
Since Pµ and PΦ give probability distributions on Ω, and W ∗ is a function
over Ω, we will have Φ ≺ µ in Strassen’s sense if the above inequality holds for
all continuous and concave functions over Ω.
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We can show that W ∗ is continuous and concave in pi: Let pin → pi weakly.
Let u∗n be optimal for pin. Then:
|
∫
c(x, u∗n)pin(dx)−
∫
c(x, u∗)pi(dx)|
≤ max(
∫
c(x, u∗n)(pin(dx)− pi(dx)),
∫
c(x, u∗)(pi)n(dx) − pi(dx))
We note that
∫
c(x, u∗n)(pin(dx) − pi(dx)) goes to
∫
c(x, u∗)(pin(dx) − pi(dx))
weakly following an argument in [34, Theorem 3.5] or [21, Theorem 3.5], and
since pin weakly converges to pi, the first term converges to zero. The second
term converges to zero by the weak convergence of pin to pi.
Therefore, we have continuity of W ∗. Concavity of W ∗ in the conditional
measure pi(dx|y) follows from Proposition 2.1. Now, if one can show that by
using all bounded continuous (and, if needed, measurable only in the actions,
as studied earlier) cost functions c and compact action spaces U, the space of
all continuous and concave functions on Ω is spanned by the space of all W ∗
functions, then a converse can be attained through Strassen’s result with some
additional work. However, this is not immediate. This discussion motivated our
self-sufficient analysis presented in the previous section.
Remark 3.1 We note that the problem above of the span of W ∗ functions
has a natural interpretation in the context of games. We observe that W ∗(y′)
is the expected cost for the player given that the player’s observation is y′.
Thus, we can re-frame our above question as follows: given some function
f : Y → R, an information structure µ, and state/action spaces X and U,
does there exist some continuous and bounded cost function c(x, u) such that
f(y′) = infγ∈ΓE
γ
Pµ [c(x, γ(y))|y = y
′]? If this is true for any continuous and
concave f with arbitrary µ, X, and U, then the relationship between Strassen’s
result and the converse to Blackwell becomes clear.
The answer to this general problem, however, is negative: Consider a game
with X = {0, 1}, Y = [0, 1], an arbitrary distribution ζ on X, and an in-
formation structure such that the player’s measurement is given by y = ν
for all x ∈ X, where ν is a uniformly distributed random variable on [0, 1];
i.e., the player only measures noise. In this case, the player’s optimal strat-
egy for any game c(x, u) will be independent of his measurement, since the
measurement is completely irrelevant to the cost. Therefore, the expected cost
f(y′) = infu∈UE
γ
Pµ [c(x, u)|y = y
′] will be constant for all y ∈ Y for any cost
function and action space, and thus cannot span all continuous and concave
f : Y→ R.
Thus, we conclude that Strassen’s theorem does not imply a converse to
Blackwell’s ordering of information structures in standard Borel spaces.
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4 Comparison of Information Structures for Zero-
Sum standard Borel Bayesian Games
We are now prepared to order information structures in the spirit of Theorem
2.2 for this standard Borel setup. We note that the following lemmas, theorem,
and corollary also hold in the general finite case studied by Pęski, as they rely
solely on the existence of equilibria (which are guaranteed to exist in the finite
setup by Von Neumann’s min-max theorem, see [37]) and Blackwell’s ordering
of information structures. Therefore, these results also serve as a strict general-
ization of Theorem 2.2 to standard Borel Bayesian Games. We note here that
the required absolute continuity conditions always hold for finite or countable
spaces (in that one can always find a reference measure with respect to which
all probability measures on a countable space is absolutely continuous).
Definition 4.1 For fixed X with x ∼ ζ, and fixed and compact Y1,Y2, we
define a class of games G˜ζ(X,Y
1,Y2) to be all games for which the players
have compact action spaces and the cost function is bounded and continuous in
players’ actions for every state x.
Lemma 4.1 Given fixed X, ζ and fixed and compact Y1,Y2, for any information
structure µ which satisfies Assumption 2.1 and any kernels κi ∈ Ki:
κmaxµ . µ and µ . κminµ
over all games in G˜ζ(X,Y
1,Y2).
Proof. Let us consider the first relation.
Take an arbitrary zero-sum game G ∈ G˜ζ(X,Y1,Y2) with cost function c and
action spaces U1 and U2. Let (γ1, γ2) be the Bayesian Nash equilibrium policies
for the players under information structure κmaxµ and (η1, η2) be the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium policies under information structure µ. By our assumption on
G˜, these policies exist [Theorem 3.1]. Let Qi be the measurement channel for
player i under information structure µ.
The expected value of the cost for the maximizer under the first information
structure is:
V κ
maxµ
G (γ
1, γ2) =
∫
X×Y1×Y2
c(x, γ1(y1), γ2(y2))Q1(dy1|x)κmaxQ2(dy2|x)ζ(dx)
By definition, the equilibrium solution (γ1, γ2) for G under κmaxµ is given
by the solution to the min-max problem:
min
θ1∈Γ1
max
θ2∈Γ2
V κ
maxµ
G (θ
1, θ2)
Therefore, since γ1 is the minimizing policy under κmaxµ, by perturbing the
minimizer’s policy γ1 to be the policy η1 ∈ Γ1 we have the following inequality
(i.e. we make the minimizer no longer play her optimal policy):
V κ
maxµ
G (γ
1, γ2) ≤ V κ
maxµ
G (η
1, γ2)
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We now wish to compare the two quantities V κ
maxµ
G (η
1, γ2) and V µG (η
1, η2).
To do so, fix η1 across both terms and consider a cost function c˜(x, θ2(y2)) :
X × U2 → R such that c˜(x, θ2(y2)) = c(x, η1(y1)), θ2(y2)) ∀ θ2 ∈ Γ2. I.e., by
holding the minimizer’s strategy constant as η1, we reduce c to c˜ such that we
now have a cost function that only reflects dependence on the maximizer’s policy
when the minimizer’s policy is held at η1. Such a function c˜ clearly exists, as
the value of η1(y1) is only dependent on x (potentially in some stochastic way,
in that it depends on Q1(y|x)), when η1 (and µ1) are constant, and so can be
absorbed into the dependency of c˜ on x.
We can now compare the single-player decision problem for the maximizer
given by cost function c˜ and information structures (κmaxµ)max and µmax (the
maximizer’s private information structures present in κmaxµ and µ, respec-
tively). This is a single-player decision problem and as such can be treated
using the forward direction to Blackwell’s ordering of information structures [6,
Theorem 2], which holds in this infinite-dimensional case [40, ]. Since c˜ and
c are equal over all strategies in Γ2, we know that γ2 and η2 are still optimal
policies for the maximizer to play under his respective information structures
for this game. Thus, since (κmaxµ)max is a garbling of µmax by channel κmax,
and since c˜(x, η2(y2)) = c(x, η1(µ1(x)), η2(y2)), we have that:
V κ
maxµ
G (η
1, γ2)
=
∫
X×Y2
c˜(x, γ2(y2))κmaxQ2(dy2|x)ζ(dx)
≤
∫
X×Y2
c˜(x, η2(y2))Q2(dy2|x)ζ(dx)
=V µG (η
1, η2)
Putting this all together, we have V κ
maxµ
G (γ
1, γ2) ≤ V κ
maxµ
G (η
1, γ2) ≤ V µG (η
1, η2).
Since this is true for any arbitrary game G ∈ G˜ζ(X,Y1,Y2), we have that
κmaxµ . µ.
A nearly identical argument can be applied to show that µ . κminµ. ⋄
Using a similar reasoning, we also develop the following converse result:
Lemma 4.2 Take fixed X, ζ, fixed and compact Y1,Y2, and information struc-
tures Φ and µ which both satisfy Assumption 2.1. If Φ . µ over all games in
G˜ζ(X,Y
1,Y2), then there exist kernels κi ∈ Ki such that:
κminΦ = κmaxµ
In particular, under Assumption 2.2, we have the more explicit characterization
with
κminQ1Φ = Q
1
µ and Q
2
Φ = κ
maxQ2µ.
Where Qiµ and Q
i
Φ are the measurement channels for player i under information
structures µ and Φ, respectively.
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Proof. Let (γ1, γ2) be the equilibrium solution under Φ and let (η1, η2)
be the equilibrium solution under µ. Let QiΦ and Q
i
µ be the measurement
channel for player i under the information structures Φ and µ, respectively.
As in Lemma 4.1, these equilibria exist and are the solutions of the standard
min-max problem.
Therefore, we have the following inequality:
V ΦG (γ
1, η2) ≤ max
θ2∈Γ2
V ΦG (γ
1, θ2) = V ΦG (γ
1, γ2)
Likewise, we can determine the following:
V µG (η
1, η2) = min
α1∈Γ1
V ΦG (α
1, η2) ≤ V µG (γ
1, η2)
In addition, by assumption that Φ . µ we have that:
V ΦG (γ
1, γ2) ≤ V µG (η
1, η2)
From above, one observes that V ΦG (γ
1, η2) ≤ V µG (η
1, η2). In the same manner
as in Lemma 4.1, we hold η2 constant across both terms and develop a reduced
single-player cost function c˜. We then have a single-player decision making
problem where we observe that γ1 and η1 are still the optimal policies for the
minimizer for each respective information structure:
J(ζ,Φmin, γ1) =
∫
X×Y1
c˜(x, γ1(y1))Q1Φ(dy
1|x)ζ(dx)
≤
∫
X×Y1
c˜(x, η1(y1))Q1µ(dy
1|x)ζ(dx) = J(ζ, µmin, η1)
Since the inequality V ΦG (γ
1, η2) ≤ V µG (η
1, η2) holds true for every arbitrary
zero-sum game G ∈ G˜ζ(X,Y1,Y2), it holds for every game in the subclass Gˆ,
defined here to be all games in G˜ζ(X,Y1,Y2) where the action space of the
maximizer is U2 = {0}. Moreover, we observe that for any arbitrary bounded
single-player cost function that is continuous in the player’s action c¯(x, u1) :
X×U→ R there exists a two-player cost function cˆ(x, u1, u2) corresponding to
some game in Gˆ such that cˆ(x, u1, u2) = c¯(x, u1) ∀ u1 ∈ U1 (following naturally
from the fact that u2 = 0 for these games). One such construction of cˆ would be
cˆ(x, u1, u2) = c¯(x, u1) + u2; when played in Gˆ, cˆ(x, u1, u2) = c¯(x, u1) ∀ u1 ∈ Γ1.
We note that since c¯(x, u1) is continuous in u1 for all x and is bounded, it is a
valid for a game in Gˆ ⊂ G˜ζ(X,Y1,Y2) to use cˆ(x, u1, u2).
Therefore, c¯ is a valid single-player reduction of cˆ when the maximizer’s
strategy is held constant. Since this process can be done for any single-player
cost function cˆ, we observe that for constant Ui and X, the reduction of all mea-
surable and bounded two-player cost functions that are continuous in player’s
actions with one player playing a constant strategy is surjective on the entire
space of bounded single-player cost functions that are continuous in the player’s
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action. Therefore, the inequality above will hold over all single-player cost func-
tions that are bounded and continuous in action, since it holds over all arbitrary
two-player game G ∈ G˜ζ(X,Y1,Y2).
Lastly, we observe that since c is framed such that a higher quantity is better
for the maximizer, the minimizer wants to minimize the value of c˜. Therefore,
from the minimizer’s perspective, the inequality above indicates that she can
never perform worse under Φ than under µ over all single-player problems with
bounded cost functions that are continuous in the player’s action. Thus, by
the converse direction to Blackwell’s ordering of information structures [6, The-
orem 6], which by the lemma assumptions and the restrictions on the class
G˜ζ(X,Y
1,Y2) (namely compactness of Yi and Ui) holds in this infinite setup
due to Theorem 3.2, we have that µmin must be a garbling of Φmin.
In a similar manner, by observing that V ΦG (γ
1, γ2) ≤ V µG (γ
1, η2) one discovers
that Φmax must be a garbling of µmax.
Therefore, we have that the minimizer’s channel in Φ is garbled in µ and
the maximizer’s channel in µ is garbled in Φ. Combining these two conditions
yields the desired equality for some κi ∈ K:
κminΦ = κmaxµ
⋄
The following is our main result.
Theorem 4.1 Take fixed X, ζ, fixed and compact Y1,Y2, and information struc-
tures Φ and µ which both satisfy Assumption 2.1. Then µ is better for the max-
imizer than Φ (Φ . µ) over all games in G˜ζ(X,Y
1,Y2) if and only if there exist
kernels κi ∈ Ki such that:
κminQ1Φ = Q
1
µ and Q
2
Φ = κ
maxQ2µ
Proof. The if direction follows directly from Lemma 4.1:
Φ . κminΦ = κmaxµ . µ
The only if direction is given in Lemma 4.2. ⋄
Corollary 4.1 Take fixed X, ζ, and fixed and compact Y1,Y2. The value of
additional information to a decision maker is never negative for that decision
maker in any zero-sum game in G˜ζ(X,Y
1,Y2).
Proof. If µ is an information structure which is more informative for the
maximizer than another information structure Φ, we know there exists a kernel
κmax such that Φ = κmaxµ, and so know that V ∗(G,µ) ≥ V ∗(G,Φ), and κmax
is a well-defined map since we can map any additional information to a fixed
number. ⋄
We note that the value of information is not always positive to a player,
since many situations (such as where the action set is a singleton) will result in
no change in performance despite additional information.
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Corollary 4.1 is consistent with the work of De Meyer, Lehrer and Rosenberg
[25, Theorem 3.1], who found this result when studying the value of information
in zero-sum games with incomplete information with a slightly different setup,
where the ‘state of nature’ was replaced by an individual ‘type’ for each player
drawn from a finite space, and where the cost function depended on both players’
types.
We note that for Theorem 4.1, the proof will follow for any class of zero-
sum games for which every game has an equilibrium solution and Blackwell’s
ordering of information structures holds for each player when holding the other
player’s action constant. Therefore, the ordering result can be generalized to be
applicable for more general classes of zero-sum games than G˜ζ(X,Y1,Y2).
4.1 Discussion
This main result comes with the following intuitive interpretation:
An information structure µ is better for the maximizer than Φ if and only
if one of the following holds:
1. Φmax is a non-identity garbling of the maximizer’s channel from µ, and
the minimizer’s channel is identical.
2. µmin is a non-identity garbling of the minimizer’s channel from Φ, and the
maximizer’s channel is identical.
3. Φmax is a non-identity garbling of the maximizer’s channel from µ, and
µmin is a non-identity garbling of the minimizer’s channel from Φ.
4. The information structures are identical.
In plain terms, this has the following interpretation: In zero-sum games, im-
proving or hurting both players’ information structures will never give a general
benefit to either player over all games. The only time a player will not do worse
under a new information structure is if it only makes his channel better, only
makes his opponent’s channel worse, makes his channel better and his oppo-
nent’s channel worse, or is identical to the previous information structure (and
the player is guaranteed to not do worse if any of these conditions holds).
In the following, we present an example showing that we cannot view gar-
bling from decision maker to decision maker in isolation from the entire infor-
mation structure. Consider a finite probability space game with X = U = Y =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, with x distributed according to the uniform distribution, and cost
function:
c(x, u1, u2) =


−12, u1 = x and u1 6= u2
−5, u1 = x and u1 = u2
0, otherwise
Player 1 (the minimizer) gets rewarded for guessing x correctly, and Player
2 (the maximizer) can only limit his losses by playing the same action as Player
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1. We can observe that Player 1’s optimal strategy will always be to attempt
to guess x correctly, since she is only penalized for guessing incorrectly, while
Player 2’s optimal strategy will always be to attempt to copy Player 1’s action
since that is the only way he can positively affect the outcome for himself.
Now consider the following two information structures:
µ1: Under this information structure, both players receive the same random
measurement y1 = y2 = y, where y = x with probability 0.9 and y is any of
the other three incorrect values with probability 0.1/3. Under this information
structure, the best strategy for Player 1 (and thus also for Player 2) is to guess
her observation, so u1 = u2 = y and the expected payoff is −4.5.
µ2: Under this information structure, both players receive conditionally
(given x) independent measurements. For Player 1, y1 = x with probability
0.85, and is any of the three incorrect values of x with probability 0.05 each.
Player 2 has the same structure as under µ1, with a 0.9 chance of success, al-
beit now uncoupled with Player 1’s chance of success. The optimal strategies
remain the same under this information structure, but the expected payoff is
now −4.845.
Therefore, µ2 is better for the minimizer than µ1. But, we can observe that
the minimizer’s channel in µ2 is garbled from µ1, in the sense that the distri-
bution on Y1 for Player 1 can be run through a stochastic kernel to get the
distribution under µ2. The maximizer’s channel is identical in both games in
the sense that the distribution on Y2 is unchanged. Yet, the ordering of infor-
mation structures rule from Theorem 2.2 has been violated, since the minimizer
performs better under the garbled information structure. This demonstrates
that we cannot consider garbling in isolation and the comparison should be in
view of the entire information structure.
If the garbling had been done in accordance with the results of this paper
so that y1 = y2 but y1 is then garbled to arrive at some y˜1 whose probability
measure is as specified under µ2, then naturally Player 1 would have a higher cost
in the equilibrium (despite the fact that the measurements are not conditionally
independent).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an ordering of information structures for a broad
class of zero-sum Bayesian games with incomplete information in standard Borel
spaces. We also provided two key supporting results: i) a refinement on the
conditions for the existence of equilibria in zero-sum games with incomplete
information in standard Borel measurement and action spaces and ii) a partial
converse to Blackwell’s ordering of information structures in this general setting.
23
6 Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to M. Pęski for his detailed comments on both the
presentation, technical content, and the related literature, and T. Başar, M. Le
Treust and M. Raginsky for their technical feedback.
References
[1] T. Başar, Stochastic differential games and intricacy of information struc-
tures, Dynamic Games in Economics (Josef Haunschmied, Vladimir M. Ve-
liov, and Stefan Wrzaczek, eds.), Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in
Economics and Finance, vol. 16, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 23–
49 (English).
[2] T. Başar and Y.-C. Ho, Informational properties of the Nash solutions of
two stochastic nonzero-sum games, Journal of Economic Theory 7 (1974),
no. 4, 370–387.
[3] T. Başar and G.J. Olsder, Dynamic noncooperative game theory, SIAM
Classics in Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia, PA, 1999.
[4] E. J. Balder, On ws-convergence of product measures, Mathematics of Op-
erations Research 26 (2001), no. 3, 494–518.
[5] B. Bassan, O. Gossner, M. Scarsini, and S. Zamir, Positive value of infor-
mation in games, International Journal of Game Theory 32 (2003), 17–31.
[6] D. Blackwell, Equivalent comparison of experiments, Annals of Mathemat-
ical Statistics 24 (1953), 265–272.
[7] C. Boll, Comparison of experiments in the infinite case, PhD Dissertation,
Stanford University, 1955.
[8] V. S. Borkar, A topology for markov controls, Applied Mathematics and
Optimization 20 (1989), no. 1, 55–62.
[9] V. S. Borkar, White-noise representations in stochastic realization theory,
SIAM J. on Control and Optimization 31 (1993), 1093–1102.
[10] L. Le Cam, Comparison of experiments - A short review, Ferguson, T.,
Shapley, L. (Eds.), Statistics, Probability and Game Theory Papers in
Honor of David Blackwell, IMS Lecture Notes Monograph Ser., 1996.
[11] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory, Wiley,
New York, 1991.
[12] R. M. Dudley, Real analysis and probability, 2nd ed., Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2002.
24
[13] E. Shmaya E. Lehrer, D. Rosenberg, Signaling and mediation in games with
common interests, Games and Economic Behaviour 68 (2006), 670–682.
[14] K. Fan, Minimax theorems, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci-
ences of the United States of America 39 (1953), 42–47.
[15] I. I. Gihman and A. V. Skorohod, Controlled stochastic processes, Springer
Science & Business Media, 2012.
[16] O. Gossner and J.-F. Mertens, The value of information in zero-sum games,
2001.
[17] O. Gossner and JF. Mertens, The value of information in zero-sum games,
preprint (2001).
[18] Jack Hirshleifer, The private and social value of information and the reward
to inventive activity, The American Economic Review (1971), 561–574.
[19] I. Hogeboom-Burr and S. Yüksel, Comparison of information structures for
zero-sum games in standard borel spaces, IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory Proceedings.
[20] Morton I Kamien, Yair Tauman, and Shmuel Zamir, On the value of in-
formation in a strategic conflict, Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1990),
no. 2, 129–153.
[21] H.J. Langen, Convergence of dynamic programming models, Math. Oper.
Res. 6 (1981), no. 4, 493–512.
[22] E. Lehrer, D. Rosenberg, and E. Shmaya, Signaling and mediation in games
with common interests, Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2010), 670–682.
[23] Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, and Shmuel Zamir, Repeated games,
vol. 55, Cambridge University Press, 2015.
[24] B. De Meyer, E. Lehrer, and D. Rosenberg, Two remarks on blackwell’s
theorem, Journal of Applied Probability 45 (2008), 580–586.
[25] B. De Meyer, E. Lehrer, and D. Rosenberg, Evaluating information in
zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides, Mathematics
of Operations Research 34 (2010), 851–863.
[26] P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber, Distributional strategies for games with
incomplete information, Mathematics of Operations research 10 (1985),
no. 4, 619–632.
[27] H. Moulin, Advanced game theory, Online Notes, 2009.
[28] J. M. G. Fell P. Cartier and P.-A. Meyer, Comparaison, des mesures portées
par un ensemble convexe compact, Bulletin de la Société Mathématique de
France 92 (1964), 435–445.
25
[29] M. Peski, Comparison of information structures in zero-sum games, Games
and Economic Behaviour 62 (2008), 732–735.
[30] M. Raginsky, Shannon meets Blackwell and Le Cam: Channels, codes, and
statistical experiments, 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Informa-
tion Theory Proceedings, IEEE, 2011, pp. 1220–1224.
[31] W. Rudin, Functional analysis, mcgraw-hill, New York (1991).
[32] N. Saldi, A topology for team policies and existence of optimal team policies
in stochastic team theory, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 65
(2020), no. 1, 310–317.
[33] M. Schäl, On dynamic programming: compactness of the space of policies,
Stochastic Processes and their Applications 3 (1975), no. 4, 345–364.
[34] R. Serfozo, Convergence of lebesgue integrals with varying measures,
SankhyÄĄ: The Indian Journal of Statistics, Series A 44 (1982), 380–402.
[35] V. Strassen, The existence of probability measures with given marginals,
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36 (1965), no. 2, 423–439.
[36] E. Torgersen, Comparison of statistical experiments, vol. 36, Cambridge
University Press, 1991.
[37] J. von Neumann, Zur theorie der gesellschaftsspiele, Mathematische An-
nalen 100 (1928), 295–320.
[38] H. Witsenhausen, Equivalent stochastic control problems, Mathematics of
Control, Signals, and Systems 1 (1988), 3–11.
[39] S. Yüksel, A universal dynamic program and refined existence results for
decentralized stochastic control, arXiv:1803.05811.
[40] S. Yüksel and T. Başar, Stochastic networked control systems: Stabilization
and optimization under information constraints, Springer, New York, 2013.
[41] S. Yüksel and T. Linder, Optimization and convergence of observation
channels in stochastic control, SIAM J. on Control and Optimization 50
(2012), 864–887.
[42] S. Yüksel and N. Saldi, Convex analysis in decentralized stochastic control,
strategic measures and optimal solutions, SIAM J. on Control and Opti-
mization 55 (2017), 1–28.
26
